In a study released yesterday,
the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
conluded that brokerage firms have earned millions
of dollars from the new competitive arrangements for
the trading of stock options, but have passed on almost
none of this money to their clients.
Previously, options on any one stock were traded on
only one exchange, but after the market was opened
up to all comers, traders specialising in options
began to offer inducements to brokerage firms to direct
option trades their way. The SEC decided to investigate
this situation, and surveyed 24 brokerage firms, which
it said accounted for nearly all options trades by
individual investors. Of those, it found that 19 had
begun taking payments for order flow, and had directed
orders to specialists that were paying for it. One
other firm had established reciprocal relationships
that amounted to the same thing, while four firms
have so far refused to accept the payments.
The SEC study did not
identify the firms that were refusing to accept the
payments. But it noted that while virtually all the
brokerage firms said they tried to send orders to
the best markets, the firms that took payments tended
to choose markets that were different from the ones
that did not have an economic stake in where the order
was sent.
The commission found
that from November 1999 through September 2000 the
options specialists paid $33 million to retail brokerage
firms for directing their orders, with one brokerage
firm collecting $6 million and six others getting
more than $2 million each. None of the large recipients
passed those payments on to customers, either through
reduced commissions or rebates.
"In fact,"
the report said, "only one firm has significantly
reduced retail commissions for executing listed options
orders, and another maintains a policy to rebate payments
received for order flow to customers."
But while the payment
for order flow has clearly made money for brokerage
firms, it seems likely that the cost has been borne
not by customers but by the exchanges themselves,
who may be achieving lower spreads. Theoretically,
this indeed ought to be the result of introducing
more competition into the market.
The SEC measured such
spreads three ways. By the first measure, the quoted
spread, it appears that spreads fell when competition
began, but have since risen back to the previous levels.
Another measure, called the realized spread, compares
the price a customer gets with the price at a later
point in time, thus taking into effect the informational
value of a customers' trade, and shows the same result.
But by the third measure,
the effective spread, which simply measures the difference
between prices of actual customer buys and sells,
the spread fell after competition came in and has
remained around the lower level ever since. By that
measure, which may be the best one, it appears that
the costs of payments to brokers are being borne by
the specialists, not passed on to customers in higher
trading costs.
"The ultimate effect
on investors remains to be seen," said Arthur
Levitt, the SEC chairman, in an interview yesterday.
"The case for continued vigilance is clear."